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CASENOTE
Supreme Court Holds Juvenile Preventive Detention Under New York Statute Not
Violative of Due Process: Schall v. Martin' Over the past two decades the United States
Supreme Court consistently has recognized the failure of the juvenile justice system to
live up to its original goals of informality and flexibility, 2
 and yet still afford juveniles
the due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.' In its opinions dealing with
the juvenile justice system the Court has been critical of the lack of procedural regularity
in delinquency proceedings and the resulting debilitating effect on the constitutional
rights of juveniles.' A factor which has been significant in shaping the Court's position
throughout its decisions in this area is its recognition of the potential consequences faced
by juveniles held to be delinquent: incarceration for a lengthy period of time in a facility
closely approximating a prison; exposure to other delinquents which may be psycholog,
ically or physically injurious; and the lasting stigma of being adjudged a juvenile delin-
quent.' Finding little to distinguish these penalties from those encountered by adult
criminals, the Court has taken the position that accused juvenile delinquents should have
the benefit of many of the same procedural protections that are available in a criminal
proceeding.
In determining which procedural safeguards are required by the due process clause,
the Court has developed a standard of "fundamental fairness." As defined by the Court,
' 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
2 The juvenile court had its genesis in the desire to provide a distinctive procedure and setting
to deal with the problems of youth. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975). The idea of crime
and punishment was to be abandoned. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 15 (1967). Juvenile proceedings
were designated as civil, rather than criminal, as the courts were theoretically engaged in deter-
mining the needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). This "parental" role assumed by the state, termed parens
patriae, was the justification for denying children procedural rights. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. Early
reformers believed that the parental goals of the juvenile court could best be achieved by a system
that was flexible and informal, rather than constrained by the procedural safeguards attendant
upon adult criminal proceedings. Id. at 15.
See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975) (Supreme Court decisions in recent years
have recognized gap between originally benign conception of the juvenile system and its realities);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) (civil labels and good intentions do not obviate the
need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19 (1967)
(departures from established principles of due process frequently have resulted not in enlightened
procedure, but in arbitrariness); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) (question as
to whether actual performance of juvenile justice system measured up to its theoretical objectives
of providing guidance and rehabilitation).
4 See, e.g., Kent, 383 U.S. at 555 (whether juvenile justice system could continue to tolerate
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults); see supra
note 3.
5 As to the incarceration of juveniles, see Winship, 397 U.S. at 374 (Harlan, J., concurring) (as
in a criminal case, the accused juvenile is exposed to a complete 1°55 of personal liberty through
state-imposed confinement); Gault, 387 U.S. at 27 (when a child is incarcerated his world is "peopled
by guards, custodians, state employees, and 'delinquents' confined with him for anything from
waywardness to rape and homicide"). Concerning the stigma attached to juvenile delinquency, see
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 n.5 (1971) (in theory the juvenile court was to affix
no stigmatizing label; in fact, a delinquent is generally viewed by society as a criminal); Gault, 387
U.S. at 23-24 (disconcerting that the term "delinquent" has come to involve only slightly less stigma
than the term "criminal" applied to adults).
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fundamental fairness requires that procedures followed in delinquency proceedings
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment mandated by the four-
teenth amendment. 6 The standard does not require a particular procedure, but merely
dictates that the steps followed incorporate procedural regularity sufficient to protect
juveniles from the oppression of the state or a biased or eccentric judge.' In applying
the fundamental fairness test, the Court has gradually incorporated into the juvenile
justice system a number of procedural protections designed to shield juveniles from the
procedural arbitrariness that could violate their right to due process. The Court has
held, for example, the following constitutional protections applicable to delinquency
proceedings: notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and
the right to confront and cross-examine; 8 proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 9 and the
guarantee against double jeopardy.'°
In the recent case of Schall v. Martin, however, the Court departed from this general
trend when it upheld the constitutionality of the pretrial preventive detention of juve-
niles. Schall dealt with a due process challenge to section 320.5(3)(b) of New York's
Family Court Act." Section 320.5(3)(b) authorizes pretrial detention of an accused ju-
venile delinquent based on a finding that there is a serious risk that the child may, before
his or her 'fact-finding hearing, commit a crime.' 2 There are no statutorily mandated
criteria which a family court judge must consider in reaching the decision on whether
to detain an accused juvenile." Such a decision is generally based on a brief interview
of the juvenile, who usually has no effective assistance of counsel, together with limited
background information supplied by the probation office." The judge need not even
make a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the
charged offense before ordering detention." If the judge decides to detain the youth,
the juvenile may be held in a detention facility for up to seventeen days prior to his or
her fact-finding hearing." In upholding the constitutionality of this statute, the Supreme
Court retreated from its critical stance toward the lack of procedural regularity in juvenile
6 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 27; Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.
7 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24, 31 (1965), and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
8 Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-59.
9 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
la Breed, 421 U.S. at 541.
1, Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2408.
' 2 Id. at 2405. The pertinent text of the statute is as follows:
I. At the initial appearance, the court in its discretion may release the respondent
or direct his detention.
3. The court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts and
reasons for so finding that unless the respondent is detained; (b) there is a serious
risk that he may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult
would constitute a crime.
N.Y. FAM. CT. Aar § 320.5 (McKinney 1983).
' 3 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Martin v.
Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
" Id. at 2420-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 8 Id. at 2413.
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proceedings and resurrected the idealistic view of the system that, in its prior decisions,
it had consistently disparaged.°
The litigation in Schutt arose when Gregory Martin was arrested on December 13,
1977 and charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal posses-
sion of a weapon.'" Martin was fourteen years old at the time, and therefore came within
the jurisdiction of New York's Family Court.'" A petition of delinquency was filed against
Martin, who made his initial appearance in Family Court on December 14, accompanied
by his grandmother. 20 The judge, citing possession of the loaded weapon, the false
address given to the police, and the lateness of the hour when Martin was arrested as
evidencing a lack of supervision, ordered Martin detained under section 320.5(3)(b) until
his fact-finding hearing. 2 ' Martin was preventively detained for a total of fifteen days
prior to his hearing. 22 A probable cause hearing for Martin was not held until five days
after he was placed in detention, although at the hearing probable cause was found to
exist for all the crimes charged. 23 At the fact-finding hearing held on December 27
through December 29, Martin was found guilty of robbery and criminal possession of a
weapon and was placed on two years probation," Ironically, therefore, although Martin
was remanded for preventive detention at his initial appearance in juvenile court, prior
even to a probable cause hearing, he was released immediately after he had been found
guilty of the crimes charged.
While still in preventive detention, Martin instituted a habeas corpus class action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 25 The class
members sought a declaratory judgment that New York's preventive detention provision,
section 320.5(3)(b), violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 26 The federal district court, ruling on this class action, held
pretrial detention under section 320.5(3)(b) violative of due process on three principal
grounds. 27 First, the court found that the provision gives the judge license to act arbi-
See supra note 2.
LB Schutt, 104 S. Ct. at 2406.
' 9 Id. The facts which pertain to the other two named plaintiffs in the class action, Luis Rosario
and Kenneth Morgan, are substantially similar to those in Martin's case. Rosario was charged with
attempted first-degree robbery and seciind:degree assault. Probable cause was found six days after
he had been remanded under Section 32(}.5(3)(b). Twenty-one days later Rosario was released to
his father, and the case was later terminated without adjustment. Morgan was charged on March
27,1978 with attempted robbery and attempted grand larceny. He had been arrested four previous
times, and his mother refused to conic to court this time. A probable cause hearing was not held
until April 4. Morgan was found guilty of harassment and petty larceny and was placed with the
Department of Social Services for 18 months. id. at 2407-08.
2° Id, at 2406.
2 ' Id. at 2407.
22 Id.
" Id.
24 Id.
"Id. at 2408.
2° Id. The district court certified the class, and also held that the petitioners were not required
to exhaust their state remedies before resorting to federal habeas, as the highest state court of New
York already had rejected an identical challenge to the statute. Id. The petitioners also brought an
equal protection claim, but did not raise it on appeal. Id. at 2408 n.l 1.
" Id. at 2408 n.12. See United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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trarily and capriciously in predicting the likelihood of future criminal conduct." Second,
the court held that pretrial detention without a prior adjudication of probable cause is
a per se violation of due process." Third, pretrial preventive detention is constitutionally
impermissible, according to the court, because the detainee is punished before he or she
has been adjudicated guilty. 3°
In affirming the district court's holding, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that the provision was not utilized principally for preventive
purposes, but rather to impose punishment for unadjudicated criminal acts.' The ap-
peals court stressed that the vast majority of detained juveniles either have their petitions
dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after adjudication." In
addition, the court of appeals found that the state's interest in preventing crime was not
sufficiently compelling in this instance to justify upholding the provision."
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' deci-
sion," and held that preventive detention under the New York Family Court Act does
not violate the due process rights guaranteed to juveniles by the fourteenth amend-
ment." Applying the "fundamental fairness" standard it had developed in its past
juvenile justice cases, 36 the Court determined that section 320.5(3)(b) serves the legitimate
state objective of protecting both the community and the juvenile from the consequences
of crime." The Court further found that the procedural protections afforded pretrial
detainees under the New York statute satisfy the requirements of the due process
clause."
Schall's principal significance lies in the Supreme Court's shift in emphasis from the
liberty and due process rights of the juvenile, which were the focus of its prior opinions
in the area of juvenile justice, to the crime prevention interests of the state. The Court
now appears to view the state's crime prevention interests as overriding, perhaps due to
the rise in serious juvenile offenses. This change in perspective does not, however,
provide support for the Court's holding in Schall, which subjects juveniles to conse-
quences that are comparable to those suffered by adult criminals without providing the
corresponding procedural protections. The Court reaches this outcome by giving insuf-
ficient consideration to the realities of conditions in juvenile detention facilities, and by
reviving a view of the juvenile court system as functioning in a parental, or "parens
patriae," capacity toward the juvenile. In its previous decisions in this area, however, the
Court itself has disavowed such an idealistic view of juvenile delinquency proceedings.
211 Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 712-13.
29 Id. at 717. The district court here relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), in which the Court held pretrial detention of adults without a finding
of probable cause per se unconstitutional. Id. at 114.
su Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 716.
31 Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1982).
92 1d. at 369 n.18.
"Id. at 372-73.
Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2405-06. Justice Rehnquist was joined in the majority opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, along with Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor. Id. at 2405. The
dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens. Id. at 2419 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2405-06.
56 Id. at 2409.
" Id. at 2415.
"Id. at 2417.
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In Scholl the Court, relying on the parens patriae concept, upheld a broad pretrial
detention scheme without providing any guidelines by which the detention decision
should be made. Content to allow review of detention decisions to be made on a case by
case basis, the Court did not adequately address the difficulties inherent in individual
review, one of which is that a detainee would find it difficult to convince an appellate
court that he or she would not have committed a crime if released. The Court's general
position in Scholl is one of detachment from the juvenile delinquency process in an effort
to maintain an anachronistic goal of "flexibility and informality" within the system.
This casenote will analyze the Scholl decision and discuss its potential ramifications
on both future Supreme Court cases in the area of juvenile due process and on the
juvenile justice system itself. First the casenote will present a historical overview of
Supreme Court opinions concerning constitutionally required protections for juveniles
in delinquency proceedings. Second, the reasoning of both the majority and the dis-
senting opinions in Scholl will be discussed. The casenote will then analyze these opinions,
and will conclude that the dissenting opinion is more historically consistent in its reason-
ing and outcome with the Court's prior decisions. Finally, the potential ramifications of
the Scholl Court's holding on the juvenile justice system will be discussed, as well as
Scholl's effect on future Supreme Court decisions in this area.
1. THE FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS TEST AND THE GROWTH OF ITS APPLICATION TO
JUVENILE DUE PROCESS
An examination of the Supreme Court's major juvenile justice opinions during the
past twenty years reveals the Court's doubt as to whether the separate, civil juvenile
delinquency proceedings have sufficiently protected juveniles' due process rights. Ac-
knowledging that the lack of procedural requirements has had a detrimental effect,
particularly in light of its recognition that the penalties and trauma to which the juvenile
delinquent is subjected closely approximate those visited upon adult criminals, the Court
developed a "fundamental fairness" standard by which it measures juvenile justice cases.
This test requires procedural regularity in delinquency proceedings such that juveniles
do not find themselves the victims of the very "flexibility" that was intended to be the
advantage of a separate juvenile system. Over the past two decades the Court has found
that juveniles' due process rights could be protected by the application of some criminal
procedural safeguards to the delinquency proceeding. Although the increase in proce-
dural protections served to lessen the system's informality, the Court generally took the
position that, while the informality concern is a valid one, it cannot take precedence over
due process if the juvenile proceedings are to comport with the fundamental fairness
required by the fourteenth amendment.
In the 1966 case of Kent v, United Statess 9 the Supreme Court first evaluated the
juvenile justice system in light of its intended purposes, its general failure to accomplish
those purposes, and the remedies which were needed to bring juvenile delinquency
proceedings within the boundaries of the due process clause. The defendant in Kent was
sixteen years old and on probation when he was arrested for rape and robbery. 40 He
was detained at the Receiving Home for Children for almost a week without an arraign-
39 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
1 Id. at 543.
-N.
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ment or a determination of probable cause by a judicial officer." In his pretrial motions,
Kent sought to be placed in psychiatric care, and also requested that his counsel be given
access to his Social Service file to aid in the preparation of his defense:42 The judge did
not rule on either motion, but proceeded to waive jurisdiction over Kent pursuant to a
District of Columbia statute," remanding his case to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for trial without reciting any reasons for the decision."
The Supreme Court concluded that the procedure followed in Kent violated the
juvenile's due process rights." The Court held that Kent was entitled to a hearing on
the issue of whether the juvenile court should waive jurisdiction over his case.' It was
also required, added the Court, that the juvenile court judge provide a statement of
reasons for the waiver decision." The Court in reaching its holding examined the
procedures followed to determine whether they comported with "the essentials of due
process and fairness."'" This approach, which was to become a standard in later Supreme
Court juvenile justice cases," focused on the need for procedural regularity. 50 Applying
this standard to Kent, the Court stated that while the statute governing waiver of juris-
diction over a juvenile grants the judge a substantial degree of discretion, it assumes
procedural regularity sufficient, under the circumstances, to satisfy the basic require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment." These necessary safeguards were not being
employed in the application of the District of Columbia waiver statute, and thus the
Court found the procedure unconstitutional. Statutory discretion does not, the Court
emphasized, confer upon the juvenile court judge a license for arbitrary procedure.r' 2
In holding that the waiver procedure in Kent violated the juvenile's due process
rights, the Supreme Court expressed its growing concern as to whether the juvenile
41 Id. at 544. The Court noted that, in the case of adults, arraignment before a magistrate for
determination of probable cause is provided for by law and regarded as fundamental. Id. at 545
n.3.
42 Id. at 545-46.
43 The District of Columbia waiver of jurisdiction statute provides as follows:
When a child 16 years of age or over is charged with an offense which if committed
by a person 18 years of age or over is a felony, or when a child under 18 years of age
is charged with an offense which if committed by a person 18 years of age or over is
punishable by death or life imprisonment, a judge may, after full investigation, waive
jurisdiction and order the child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court
which would have jurisdiction of the offense if committed by a person 18 years of age
Or over ... ,
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 11-1553 (West 1966). While the above-cited provision is the most current,
the statute under which jurisdiction was waived in Kent, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1 1 -9 14 (1961), contained
substantially the same language.
44 Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
4 ' Id. at 554.
46 Id. at 557.
47 Id.
"Id. at 553.
49 See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,543 (1971) (applicable due process standard
is fundamental fairness); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,365 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is among essentials of "due process and fair treatment" required during juvenile adjudicatory stage).
6° Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
51 Id. The Juvenile Court Act provision at issue in Kent expressly provided only for a "full
investigation." Id. at 547; see D.C. CODE ENCYCL.. § 11-1553 (West 1966). It contained no standards
to govern the judge's decision as to waiver of jurisdiction. Kent, 383 U.S. at 547.
52 383 U.S. at 553.
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justice system as a whole was performing its function in such a way as to provide juveniles
with fair treatment. 55 The theoretical objectives of a separate, civil juvenile justice system,
according to the Court, were to provide guidance and rehabilitation for the child and
protection for society, and not to fix criminal responsibility." Because the state was
supposed to proceed in a parens patriae manner toward the child, the Court observed,
courts in the past had relied on the premise that the proceedings were civil in nature,
and not criminal, to assert that the child could not have the benefit of important rights
available in criminal cases. 55 The Court acknowledged, however, that serious questions
were being raised by commentators as to whether the system's actual performance
sufficiently protected juveniles' rights so as to tolerate immunity of the process from the
reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults. 56
Doubts concerning whether a juvenile's due process rights were sufficiently protected
under the existing separate juvenile system continued to plague the Court when in 1967
it decided the case of In re Gault.'' In Gault, a fifteen year old boy was adjudged a
delinquent for making lewd telephone calls, and was committed to an Industrial School
for six years by an Arizona juvenile court. 56 No notice was given to the boy's parents
that he had been taken into custody, and they were not served with a copy of the petition
alleging delinquency. 59 The complainant, the recipient of the telephone call, did not
attend the boy's hearing, and no record was made of the proceedings. 6° The Supreme
Court reversed the sentence on due process grounds, holding that certain procedural
rights not present in the disposition of Gault's case were guaranteed the juvenile by the
Constitution. 6 ' These rights included adequate notice of charges, 62 the right to counse1,65
the right of cross-exarnination, 64 and the privilege against self-incrimination. 65
In concluding that the Arizona procedure was unconstitutional, the Gault Court
applied the Kent standard of due process and fairness to the juvenile delinquency
proceeding at issue, and adopted an even stronger stance in affirming the applicability
of the fourteenth amendment to the juvenile system. 66 The Court again criticized the
lack of substantive standards and procedural rules in delinquency proceedings as com-
pared with those available in criminal trials. 67 The Court noted that if Gault had been
over the age of eighteen, he would have been subject to a lesser sentence, and further,
would have been entitled to substantial procedural rights under both the United States
and Arizona Constitutions. 65
" Id. at 555-56.
" Id. at 554.
"hi. at 555. The Court stressed, however, that the purpose of the juvenile judge — to function
in a "parental" relationship — was not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness. Id.
56 Id .
" 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
56 Id. at 7-8.
59 Id. at 5.
€0 Id. at 5-6.
I Id. at 30-31.
62 Id. at 33.
o Id. at 41.
64 Id. at 57.
65 Id. at 55.
66 Id. at 13, 18-31.
" M. at 18-19.
'4' Id. at 29.
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In reaching its decision to overturn the juvenile's sentence, the Court stated that
the separate juvenile justice system was originally based on the belief that the state should
proceed in a parens patriae capacity in juvenile proceedings. Acting in such a capacity,
the Court continued, the state was not to determine the child's guilt or innocence, but
was to ascertain what the child's circumstances were and what was best to be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state." The Court observed that the right of states to
deny children procedural rights had been justified by early proponents of a separate
juvenile system with the assertion that a child was always in some form of custody."°
Therefore, a child being committed to the custody of the State, the Court noted, had
not been viewed in the same light as an adult in similar circumstances." The Gault Court
asserted that both the justification for and the results of the system were deeply troubling,
and stated that departures from established principles of due process had frequently
resulted not in enlightened procedure, but rather in arbitrariness2 2 The failure to
observe the fundamental requirements of due process, according to the Court, had also
been responsible for instances of unfairness, inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact,
and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy." In concluding its overview of the juvenile
justice system, the Court found that the history of that system had demonstrated that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, was frequently a poor substitute
for principled procedure."
The Gault Court was, overall, unwilling to accept the ''civil' label-of-convenience"
that had been applied to the juvenile justice system." The "civil" label, according to the
Court, was used by proponents of a separate, minimally regulated juvenile system in an
attempt to distinguish juvenile proceedings and their consequences from full-fledged
criminal trials." The Court, however, found this distinction artificial." The Court further
stressed that it was of no constitutional consequence that the institution to which the
juvenile was committed in Gault was called an "industrial school."" The Court stated
that the "school" was merely an institution in which the child was incarcerated with his
world "peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and 'delinquents' confined with
him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide." 79 In order to expose a
juvenile to such conditions, the Court required a hearing that would incorporate the
essentials of due process and fair treatment."
69 Id. at 16; see Mack, The Juvenile Court, '23 HArtv. L. REV. 104,109-10 (1909).
7° Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
7, Id.
72 Id. at 18-19.
"Id. at 19-20.
74 Id. at 18. The Court stated:
The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive
careful, compassionate, individualized treatment .... Departures from established
principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but
in arbitrariness.
Id. at 18-19.
7, Id. at 49-50.
76 Id.
77
 Id. at 50.
78 Id. at 27.
79 Id .
80 Id. at 30 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562).
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In the 1970 case of In re Winship, 9 ' the Court continued its expansion of the
protections available to the juvenile in delinquency proceedings. The Court in Winship
struck down a twelve year old's six year sentence to a training school for stealing a
pocketbook," and held the criminal evidentiary requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt applicable to juvenile fact-finding hearings." As it had in the two previous
cases of Gault and Kent, the Court applied the "essentials of due process and fair
treatment" standard," and concluded that the same considerations that demand extreme
caution in fact-finding to protect adults apply equally to children." The Court found
this caution to be particularly important in light of the Gault decision, where it had
explicitly rejected the theory that juvenile proceedings were not designed to punish but
purely to rehabilitate the child."
The Court was not ready, however, to give up completely on the concept of a
separate juvenile justice system. While acknowledging the persistent shortcomings of
juvenile proceedings, the Court sought to preserve what it believed to be a beneficial
aspect of the system's separateness: maintenance of a certain degree of informality and
flexibility in dealing with youthful offenders. 87 Therefore, in reaching its decision in
Winship, the Court noted that applying the reasonable doubt requirement to juvenile
proceedings would not affect the informality, flexibility, or speed of the fact-finding
hearing."
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, criticized the Court's holding for its lack, in his
view, of sufficient emphasis on the flexibility concern. 89 According to Chief Justice
Burger, the juvenile system needed not more but less judicial formalism in order to
survive as a separate process. 90 In declaring his opposition to the "further strait-jacketing
of an already overly restricted system," 91 Chief justice Burger's dissent was indicative of
his apprehension that the juvenile system's original goals of informality and flexibility,
qualities that he still considered important to the uniqueness of the system, were being
unduly suppressed by the Court's opinions in favor of more rigid, trial-type proceedings.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,92 decided one year after Winship, the Supreme Court
applied the same reasoning as it had in its prior opinions, but concluded that it was
unnecessary to transfer a particular criminal constitutional right to juvenile adjudication.
In a plurality opinion, the McKeiver Court held that trial by jury was not a constitutional
requirement in juvenile proceedings.° Joseph McKeiver, age sixteen, was charged with
robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods as acts of juvenile delinquency under Penn-
BI 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
82 Id. at 360-61.
" Id. at 368.
81 Id. at 367.
85 Id. at 365.
g6 Id.
87 Id. at 367.
88 Id_ at 366. This consideration seems slightly at variance with the rest of the opinion's strong
reliance on Gault's critical view of the often unjust results of the minimally regulated juvenile court
system.
82 Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"Id.
" Id.
92
 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
93 Id. at 528, 545.
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sylvania law." McKeiver's actual offense was participating with twenty or thirty youths
in pursuing three young teenagers and taking twenty-five cents from them. 95 McKeiver
was represented by counsel at his adjudication hearing, but he did not meet his counsel
until immediately prior to the hearing and was allowed only a five minute interview. 96
McKeiver's request for a jury trial was denied; he was adjudged a delinquent and placed
on probation.97
In reaching its holding that a jury trial was not necessary in a delinquency proceed-
ing, the Court stated that juveniles were not entitled to all rights available to adult
criminal defendants. 98 Instead, the Court reasoned that only those rights which are
necessary to proper fact-finding and which would not substantially impair speed and
informality would be required. 99 Pointing out that trial by jury is not even a necessary
fact-finding element of every criminal proceeding, 0° the Court concluded that it would
not be a safeguard necessary to comport with the fundamental fairness required in a
juvenile proceeding.'" The Court stated that it did not wish to hasten the potential
result of imposing a jury requirement — delay and formality that might turn the juvenile
hearing into a full adversary proceeding.'"
The Supreme Court in McKeiver, however, as it had in its prior decisions, noted its
general disappointment with the performance of the juvenile justice system. 105 Although
reasoning that "too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart, protec-
tive, and communicating figure the system envisaged,"'" the Court nonetheless con-
cluded that the right to a jury trial would not cure this problem,w 5 which seemed more
a function of the issue of the proper role of a juvenile court judge than of his or her
fact-finding ability. Thus, while the McKeiver Court did not find a jury trial to be necessary
to juvenile due process, it did not depart from its traditional approach to juvenile justice
cases of requiring fair procedures which would satisfactorily protect the juvenile's liberty
interest.
The decision of the Court four years later, in Breed v. Jones,'°6 demonstrated that
McKeiver did not represent a true break from the Court's earlier juvenile justice cases.
In Breed, a unanimous Court held that a juvenile found guilty of robbery in juvenile
court and subsequently tried in state superior court for the same crime had been
unconstitutionally subjected to double jeopardy.'"
94 Id, at 534-35.
9.5
	
at 536.
46 Id. at 535 & n.2.
97 Id. at 535.
96 Id, at 545-47. The Court still avoided, however, the "wooden approach" of labeling the
juvenile procedure either "civil" or "criminal." Id. at 541.
99 Id.
,00 Id. at 547.
10 ' Id. at 545. The Court, noting that the majority of states statutorily denied juveniles the right
to a jury trial, observed that when a practice is followed by a large number of states, this at a
minimum provides an inference of constitutionality. Id. at 548.
02 1d. In dissent, however, Justice Douglas stressed his belief that a child who feels he has been
dealt with fairly and not merely expediently or as speedily as possible will be a better prospect for
rehabilitation. Id. at 566 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1°3
 Id. at 543-44.
L04 Id. at 544.
, "5 Id. at 547.
106 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
107 Id. at 531. Double jeopardy is defined by the United States Constitution as follows: "[Nior
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In reaching its conclusion that the double jeopardy clause of the constitution had
been violated, the Court again employed the fundamental fairness standard. 1 °8 Noting
the gap between the original intentions of the juvenile system and its present realities,
the Breed Court reaffirmed that the civil label-of-convenience was no longer applicable
to a juvenile fact-finding hearing.'°° The Breed Court found no meaningful distinction
between the juvenile proceeding in Breed and a criminal prosecution in respect to the
kinds of risks to which the juvenile was exposed."° Such "risks" included incarceration
for a lengthy period of time, exposure to potentially dangerous juvenile offenders, and
the lasting stigma of a guilty finding."' Referring specifically to incarceration of the
juvenile, the Court reaffirmed the position taken in Gault: incarceration remains incar-
ceration, with all its potentially detrimental effects, regardless of its purportedly benev-
olent purposes. 12 The Court concluded that while the rehabilitative goals of the system
are admirable, they do not change the drastic nature of the action taken." 3 In terms of
potential consequences, therefore, the Breed Court continued to find little to distinguish
a juvenile adjudicatory hearing from a traditional criminal proceeding.'" In light of this
similarity, the Court required that a hearing on the issue of whether the juvenile should
be tried as an adult must take place prior to the juvenile court adjudication, so as to
prevent the juvenile from being unconstitutionally tried twice for the same offense. 115
The Breed Court did note that application of the rule against double jeopardy would
not diminish flexibility and informality to the extent that those qualities relate to the
goals of the juvenile court systern." 6 The Court made clear, however, that speed and
informality were not to be the sole determinative factors in reviewing a constitutional
challenge to juvenile proceedings." 7 Although the application of any due process stan-
dard would in some measure diminish flexibility, the Court emphasized that this alone
was an insufficient reason to refuse its application where warranted." 8
As is apparent from the above line of decisions, the Supreme Court's principal
concern in the juvenile justice area has been to protect the juvenile involved in a
delinquency proceeding from the potential abuses that may arise from the lack of
procedural and substantive standards in the juvenile justice system. While the Court has
also manifested a valid concurrent interest in maintaining sufficient flexibility and in-
formality within the system for it to properly handle the special needs of juvenile
offenders, it has recognized that too great an emphasis on these concerns may result in
due process violations. Thus, in these decisions the Court has asserted that, should there
be a conflict between these different interests, the flexibility and informality concerns
would not take precedence over the requirement of fundamental fairness in the proce-
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . ..."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
mg Breed, 421 U.S. at 531.
' 09 Id. at 528-29.
"° Id. at 531.
11 Id. at 530 n.12.
"2 1d. (quoting Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218,225 (5th Cir. 1973)).
"5 Id.
"4 Id. at 531.
"5 /c/. at 537-38.
"6
 Id. at 535.
117 Id. at 535 n.15.
' 1 ' Id.
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dure at issue. 19
 In its prior opinions, however, the Court had dealt exclusively with the
adjudicatory rights of juveniles. It was not until the 1984 case of Schall v. Marlin that the
Court for the first time considered the pre-adjudicatory rights of juveniles under the
due process clause.
I I. THE SCHALL OPINION
A. The Juvenile Court System of New York
Schall involved a due process challenge to section 320.5(3)(b) of the New York Family
Court Act. 12° This section provides for pretrial preventive detention of any juvenile
whom the judge believes would be substantially likely to commit a crime if released. 121
In determining whether section 320.5(3)(b) violates the Constitution the primary focus
is on the detention procedure itself and the extent to which it fails to provide protections
which comply with the fundamental fairness standard established by the Supreme
Court. 122
 Fundamental fairness implies procedural regularity sufficient to comport with
the due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment.'" Thus, this subsection will
trace the application of the statute in the context of New York's juvenile justice system
as a whole.
In New York, a child over the age of seven but less than sixteen who commits an
act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult comes under the jurisdiction
of the Family Court)" When a juvenile is arrested, the arresting officer must immediately
notify the parent or guardian.'" The child then is usually released into the custody of
his or her parent or guardian after being issued an 'appearance ticket" requiring him
to meet with the probation service on a specified day. 129 The first step in the juvenile
delinquency process is termed "probation intake." 27
 This involves a ten to forty minute
interview of the juvenile, the arresting officer, and sometimes the parent or guardian by
a probation officer.'" On the basis of the information obtained in the interview together
with the juvenile's record, the probation officer decides whether the case should he
119 See supra text accompanying notes 116-18. See also Comment, The Supreme Court and Pretrial
Detention of Juveniles: A Principled Solution to a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. Rev. 95, 100 (1983).
L20 For text of section 320.5(3), see supra note 12.
121 Scholl, 104 S. Ct. at 2405.
122 Id. at 2409.
'" Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
124 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 301.2(1), 302.1(1) (McKinney 1983). Ironically, children aged 13 or
over accused of murder and children aged 14 or over accused of kidnapping, arson, rape, or a few
other serious crimes are exempted from coverage of the preventive detention provision and instead
are prosecuted as juvenile offenders in the adult criminal courts. N.Y. PENAL §§ 10.00(18), 30.00(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). These juveniles are therefore not subject to preventive detention
under this or any other provision. See Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2419 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 25 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 305.2(3) (McKinney 1983).
126 /d. § 307.1(1).
' 27 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A juvenile may arrive at intake by one
of three routes: he may be brought there directly by an arresting officer; he may be detained for
a brief period after his arrest and then taken to intake; or he may be released upon arrest and
directed to appear at a designated time. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691,
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
128 Scholl, 104 S. Ct. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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disposed of informally or whether it should be referred to Ole Family Court.' 29 If the
probation officer decides to refer the case to the court, he or she makes an additional
recommendation regarding whether the juvenile should be detained prior to his or her
fact-finding hearing.'" Section 320.5(3)(6) of the New York Family Court Act authorizes
pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquent based on a finding that there is a
"serious risk" that the child "may before the return date commit an act which if com-
mitted by an adult would constitute a crime." 131 There are no criteria which are required
to be considered when making this decision.' 32 Instead, the statute requires notice, a
hearing, and a statement of reasons from the judge for the decision reached." The
judge at the detention hearing bases his or her decision on the following: a petition for
delinquency prepared by a state agency which charges the juvenile with the offense; one
or more affidavits attesting to the juvenile's involvement in the charged offense; and the
report and recommendation of the probation officer."' The probation officer himself,
however, rarely attends the hearing.'" As the complainant generally also does not appear
at this hearing, there is frequently no one present who has personal knowledge of the
alleged offense, apart from the juvenile.'"
The judge appoints counsel for the juvenile when his case is called.'" Often the
lawyer has little opportunity to make an independent inquiry into the juvenile's back-
ground or to prepare arguments.'" In addition, the judge rarely interviews the juvenile;
he neither conducts an independent inquiry into the truth of the allegations,'" nor
determines probable cause.'" A typical hearing lasts between five and fifteen minutes
and the judge renders his decision immediately afterward."' If the judge decides that
detention is in order, the juvenile may be placed in either secure or nonsecure deten-
tion. 192 "Secure" detention, according to the New York Family Court Act, is defined as
a facility "characterized by physically restricting construction, hardware and proce-
dures." 143 A juvenile may be so detained for a period of up to seventeen days. 144
129 Id.
lij N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
In
 Scholl, 104 S. Ct. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg,
513 F. Supp. 691, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
133
 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2416-17.
134 /d. at 2420-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 2421 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136 Id. (quoting Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 702).
1971d,
158 Id.; see Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 702, 708.
139
	 104 S. Ct. at 2421 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1901d.
141 Id. A sample hearing was set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18a, the operative parts of which
Follow:
COURT OFFICER: Will you identify yourself.
TYRONE PARSON: Tyrone Parson, age 15.
THE COURT: Miss Brown, how many times has Tyrone been known to the Court?
MISS BROWN: Seven times.
THE COURT: Remand the respondent.
Id.
'" Id. at 2413.
145 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(4) (McKinney 1983). The Schall Court found secure detention
1290	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:1277
B. The Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court in Schall upheld the constitutionality of New York's pretrial
juvenile preventive detention statute under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 145 The Court concluded that detention under the statute serves the legiti-
mate state objective of crime prevention. Furthermore, the Court found the procedural
protections afforded pretrial detainees adequate to comply with the due process require-
ment of fundamental fairness. 146;
In examining the constitutionality of juvenile preventive detention, the Schall Court
first reaffirmed the principle that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
is indeed applicable in juvenile proceedings.' 47 Certain basic constitutional protections
enjoyed by adults, the Court stated, also apply to juveniles)" The Court noted, however,
that the Constitution does not require the elimination of all differences between the
treatment of adults and juveniles." 9 According to the Court, there is a fundamental
difference between the juvenile proceeding and the criminal trial; in juvenile cases the
state has a parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare of the child which is absent
in adult proceedings. 15° The Court stressed that it had always attempted to strike a
balance between the intended informality and flexibility of the juvenile proceeding and
the fundamental fairness required by the due process clause. 15 ' In analyzing whether
section 320.5(3)(b) strikes such a balance, the Court introduced a new two-prong test.' 52
The first prong focuses on whether juvenile preventive detention under section
320.5(3)(b) serves a legitimate state objective, and whether it does so without punishing
the juvenile prior to finding him or her guilty of the charged offense)" The second
prong asks whether the procedural safeguards implicit in the statute are adequate to
authorize the pretrial detention of at least some juveniles charged with crimes.' 54
Turning first to an analysis of the first prong of this new test, the Court discussed
the objectives of section 320.5(3)(b) to determine whether they were "legitimate." In
considering this issue, the Court cited a New York state case which had upheld the
to be "restrictive," but described it as approximating a dormitory, where misbehavior is punished
by confinement to one's room. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2413. Judge Quinones, a New York family court
judge, along with the Schall dissent, characterized secure detention in harsher terms. See id. at
2423-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Judge Quinones testified at the trial that juveniles in secure
detention were liable to be exposed to both assault and sexual assault. Id. The dissent noted the
further findings of the trial court that in a secure facility, the juveniles are subjected to strip-
searches, wear institutional clothing, and follow an institutional regimen. Id. at 2422 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Marlin, 513 F. Supp. at 695 n.5).
1 " Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2413.
145 Id. at 2406.
' 46 Id,
' 47 Id. at 2409.
' 46 Id.
149 1d.
'" Id.
1 " Id,
1 " Id.
'" Id. at 2409, 2412. The "legitimate state objective" standard applied by the majority is not as
stringent as that employed by the court of appeals, which sought a "compelling" state interest to
justify the detention. See Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1982).
' 54 Schad!, 104 S. Ct. at 2409.
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statute in the face of a similar constitutional challenge. 155 The New York state court had
found that the statute was designed to protect both the child and society from the
potential consequences of the juvenile's criminal acts.' 55 Finding this purpose to be a
legitimate and even compelling state interest, 157 the Court noted that the harm suffered
by a crime victim is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator. 158 In considering
the juvenile's interest in freedom, on the other hand, the Court found such interest to
be qualified by the fact that the juvenile is always in some form of custody.' 59 The Court
observed, however, that section 320.5(3)(b) could only be upheld upon a finding that
the statute was not punishing the juvenile under the guise of deterring him or her from
engaging in further criminal activity. 160 Absent express intent to punish, the Court's
analysis turned on the "alternative purpose test" of whether a purpose other than
punishment could be rationally assigned to the detention, and whether such detention
appeared excessive in relation to that purpose.'" The Court found no indication that
preventive detention was used or was intended to be used as punishment under section
320.5(3)(b). 162 Under the statute, the detention is limited in time,'" and there is an
expedited fact-finding hearing for those detained.'" Also, the detention conditions to
which the juvenile is subjected, according to the majority, are not harsh. 165 The Court
stressed the availability of both "nonsecure" and "secure" detention. 165 Although admit-
ting that "secure" detention was restrictive, the Court still found the detention to he
consistent with the state's legitimate regulatory purposes. 167 The Court stated briefly that
any individual circumstance involving a due process violation may be examined on a
case by case basis. 168 The Court concluded, therefore, that on balance the statute serves
a legitimate regulatory purpose which is compatible with fundamental fairness. 169
Turning to the second prong of its analysis, 17° the Court inquired whether the
procedures afforded the juvenile under section 320.5(3)(b) were sufficient under the
fourteenth amendment to prevent erroneous and unnecessary deprivation of liberty. 17 '
The Court initially dismissed an argument that detention of a juvenile without a deter-
' ,5 /d. at 2410 (citing People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 685, 350 N.E.2d 906,
907, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (1976)). -
156 Wayburn, 39 N.Y.2d at 689-90, 350 N.E.2d at 909-10, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 521-22.
'" Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410. The Court supported this conclusion in part by noting the existence
of juvenile preventive detention statutes in every state in the United States. Id. at 2411-12.
158
	 at 2410.
150 Id.
160 Id. It is axiomatic, stated the Court, that "[dine process requires that a pretrial detainee not
be punished." Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)).
' 6 ' Id. at 2413 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
' 62 Id.
163 Id. The detention may last for between three and seventeen days, depending on the severity
of the crime. Id.
164 Id.
"5 Id.
166 Id. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
i"Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2413-14.
' 68 Id. at 2415.
169 lei. at 2412.
'" Id. at 2415.
171
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mination of probable cause is per se invalid. 12 Although it had in a past decision required
such a determination before pretrial detention of an adult in a criminal proceeding,'"
the Court stated that it had not "mandate[d] a specific timetable" as to when the deter-
mination must be made in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 174 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that although a formal probable cause determination would at some point be
necessary in the delinquency proceeding, it was not required prior to detention because
the statutory provisions for notice, a hearing, and a statement of reasons from the judge
for his or her decision were considered to be sufficient substitutes)"
The Court therefore moved to the principal issue of the second prong of its analysis,
and reviewed the general procedure followed under section 320.5(3)(b) to determine
whether it complied with due process requirements.'" The Court found the procedure
adequate to prevent erroneous deprivation of liberty despite the fact that the great
majority of detainees are released either prior to or after the fact-finding hearing)"
Some overcaution on the part of the judge in reaching the initial decision on whether
to detain, stated the Court, is to be expected. 178 The final disposition of the case,
according to the Court, is therefore largely irrelevant to the initial decision to detain. 17 '
The Court noted that the plaintiffs did not suggest any additional procedures that would
significantly improve the accuracy of the determination without unduly impinging on
the achievement of the state's purposes.' 8°
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that, as the statute specifies no
governing criteria by which to make such a prediction, the judge's decisionmaking is
necessarily both arbitrary and subject to a high degree of error."' The plaintiffs argued
that any procedure that incorporated such subjectivity is unconstitutionally vague and
could not be considered adequate protection for the juvenile's liberty interest." 2 The
Court, however, found no reason why. specific decisionmaking guidelines must he set
forth in the statute itself in order for the statute to avoid unconstitutional vagueness.'"
The Court registered its approval of the judge's role in predicting future criminal
conduct, pointing out that such determinations are an important element in many
decisions made in the criminal justice system.'" Content to allow case by case review,
the Court repeated its earlier observation that individual litigation could be undertaken
for specific violations of rights." 5
1 " Id.
1 " Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
"4 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2415.
175 Id. at 2416-17.
176 Id.
'" Id. at 2414.
178 Id. at 2414-15 (quoting People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 690, 350 N.E.2d
906, 910, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 522 (1976)).
"9 Id. at 2415.
ISO Id. at 2417.
' 81 Id.
'"
' 83 Id. at 2418. The Court here again appeared primarily concerned with the maintenance of
flexibility and informality in the juvenile justice system. The Court also stressed that it was not a
legislature, and therefore need not determine whether the statute could have been better drafted.
Id. at 2419.
184 Id,
185 Id. at 2419.
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C. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens)"
Justice Marshall also applied the fundamental fairness standard in assessing the consti-
tutionality of New York's juvenile pretrial detention statute.' 87 Unlike the majority,
however, Justice Marshall determined that section 320.5(3)(b)'s procedural protections
were inadequate to justify the impairment of the juvenile's fundamental liberty inter-
est.'"
According to the dissent, fundamental fairness initially requires that the statute
advance goals commensurate with the burdens imposed on constitutionally protected
interests, and in so doing not punish the juvenile)" Applying this standard to Schall,
the dissent found it manifest that the application of section 320.5(3)(b) impinged upon
the juvenile's fundamental interest in liberty, 139 and thus its use could only be justified
by a weighty public interest substantially advanced by the statute) 9 ' The state's purported
crime prevention goals in this case, even if legitimate, were not, according to Justice
Marshall, sufficiently promoted by the statute to justify abridging the juvenile's consti-
tutional rights.' 99 The dissent found support for this conclusion in the outcome of the
cases in which juveniles were detained under the statute.' 93 As the great majority of
juveniles preventively detained were released either prior to or immediately following
their adjudications,'" the dissent could see no advancement of the state's crime preven-
tion goals in the manner in which section 320.5(3)(b) was implemented by the juvenile
court system. Consequently, Justice Marshall concluded that neither the juvenile nor the
public benefits from the juvenile's preventive detention under the statute.' 95
The dissent also found that section 320.5(3)(b) did not comply with fundamental
fairness because it punished the presumptively innocent juvenile.'" Even under the
majority's "alternative purpose" test,' 97 the dissent contended that the statute, as admin-
istered, was excessive in relation to the putatively legitimate objectives assigned to it, and
thus must be characterized as punitive.'" Since the pretrial detainees had not yet been
166 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 89 Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190 Id.
1 " Id. at 2424 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall criticized the majority for discounting
the child's liberty interest and for using a mere "legitimate state interest" standard in evaluating
the provision. Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 93 Id. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 94 Id.
195 Id, at 2427-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that:
only in occasional cases does incarceration of a juvenile pending his trial serve to
prevent a crime of violence and thereby significantly promote the public interest. Such
an infrequent and haphazard gain is insufficient to justify curtailment of the liberty
interests of all the presumptively innocent juveniles who would have obeyed the law
pending their trials had they been given the chance.
Id.
196 Id. at 2430 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
198 Scholl, 104 S. Ct. at 2429 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent found especially distressing,
and unsupportable on the record, the Court's benign characterization of the detention facilities. Id.
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adjudicated guilty of the charged offenses, Justice Marshall found that application of
the statute was a per se violation of due process. 199 The inference that section 320.5(3)(b)
was punitive was supported by the record, noted the dissent, as a family court judge and
even the state's counsel acknowledged that preventive detention was often used to punish
juveniles for their alleged offenses. 20°
Fundamental fairness, according to the dissent, also required procedural protections
adequate to prevent unwarranted impairment of the juvenile's liberty interest.'" Section
320.5(3)(b) lacked these safeguards, the dissent stated, to the extent that the statute was
both impermissibly vague and subject to unconstitutionally arbitrary application. 202 The
dissent viewed the majority's depiction of the adequacy of the decisionmaking process
employed in detention proceedings as "hopelessly idealized."'" As the statute by its
terms required family court judges to predict future criminal behavior, the dissent agreed
with the trial court's finding that such predictions are virtually impossible to make,
particularly with the paucity of data available at the detention hearings. 204 The prediction
is made even more subjective, Justice Marshall stated, due to the lack of statutory
guidance as to which factors a judge should consider, and what standard of proof he
should employ, in the determination.'" The dissent found that detention was not even
limited to those classes of juveniles whose past conduct suggested that they were more
likely to misbehave in the immediate future. 206 On the contrary, Justice Marshall noted
that the trial court had found that the circumstances surrounding most cases suggested
that the detainees would not have committed a crime if released. 207 This creates an
excessive risk, according to the dissent, that juveniles will be detained erroneously and
fosters arbitrariness and inequality in the decisionmaking process.'" The dissent stated
that its overriding concern was that excessive discretion may foster inequality, and can
mask the use of illegitimate criteria.'" The addition of some procedural safeguards,
according to the dissent, would create insubstantial administrative burdens."°
at 2430 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent cited testimony of a New York family court judge,
who described Juvenile Center as a place where juveniles are exposed to physical and sexual assault,
and where they are in contact with other detainees who may be "much worse" than they are. Id. at
2429-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 2425-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that there need not be a finding
of probable cause that the child committed the offense; that the provision applies to all juveniles
regardless of the severity of the offense or their prior records; and that no standard of proof
beyond "serious risk" is spelled out in the statute. Id.
201 Id. at 2431-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 2432-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, therefore, the judges
necessarily relied on their own subjective criteria. Id. at 2430 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 2430 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209
	
at 2425-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that the majority's comment
that predictions of future criminal conduct are the bases of many decisions does not take into
account that in all of those decisions the person had already been convicted of a crime. Id. at 2426
n.20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2°' Id. at 2426 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2 ')6 Id. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 705. Justice Marshall stressed
that in a significant proportion of the cases the juvenile had been released immediately following
his arrest and had not committed any reported crimes prior to his initial hearing. Schall, 104 S. Ct.
at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 2430-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2081d.
209 1d. at 2431-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. As an example of an additional safeguard, Justice Marshall suggested that the family
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Finally, the dissent took issue with the majority's statement that the constitutionality
of juvenile detention procedures should be determined on a case by case basis.'" As the
detention period is relatively brief, the dissent questioned whether the issue of mootness
could be overcome. 212 Justice Marshall further asserted that even if the mootness issue
could be skirted, it would be impossible to prove that the juvenile would have comported
with the law if he or she had not. been detained.'" As the provision is written and
administered, the dissent found that cases in which the state's goals are advanced cannot
be distinguished from those in which they are not.'" Based on its conclusion that such
individual adjudication would be an ineffective means of protecting the juvenile's con-
stitutional rights, the dissenting opinion argued that the provision should be found
unconstitutional on its face.'"
III. A CRITIQUE OF SCHALL: THE TRIUMPH OF FLEXIBILITY OVER FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS
The Schall decision evidences the Supreme Court's renewed attempt to maintain a
juvenile justice system separate from the criminal proceeding and its attendant proce-
dural protections. After twenty years of painful recognition of the juvenile justice system's
inequities, and of attempting to provide juveniles with procedures that are fair and in
compliance with due process, the Supreme Court no longer seems concerned with
protecting the juvenile from the system's failings. The Court in Schall exalts informality,
speed, and a questionably advanced goal of crime prevention over an individual's fun-
damental right to liberty. Thus, while the Court continues to employ the "due process
and fundamental fairness" standard which it has followed since Kent, in Schall it distorts
this standard by overemphasizing the state's interest in crime prevention in contrast to
the juvenile's fundamental interest in liberty. This shift in emphasis, combined with the
Court's arguably belated attempt to maintain informality and flexibility within the ju-
venile system, signifies a divergence from the Court's prior cases in this area and heralds
a "hands off" approach in future juvenile justice cases.
While reaffirming the applicability of the fourteenth amendment to juvenile delin-
quency proceedings,216 the Supreme Court in Schall placed inordinate emphasis on the
principle it had first begun to develop in McKeiver — that the Constitution and funda-
mental fairness do not require that all differences between juvenile proceedings and
criminal trials be eliminated. 2 ' 7 In McKeiver, the Court was not dealing with the regulation
of an existing procedure, but rather with the issue of whether the addition of a new
procedure which was not even guaranteed in all criminal cases should be applied to the
juvenile system. Thus, the factual justification present in McKeiver for refusing to require
court judges be required to state on the record the significance they give to the seriousness of the
charged offense and to the juvenile's background. Id.
211
	 at 2428-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212 Id.
212 Id, at 2429 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2 " Id. at 2425 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 2429 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall concluded that while the Court claimed
that the State has a responsibility to protect the interests of children, it upheld a statute whose net
impact on juveniles is overwhelmingly detrimental. Id. at 2433 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 2409.
Id. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971).
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a jury trial in juvenile cases was absent in Schall, where the Court was faced with an
existing broad preventive detention process with great potential for arbitrariness and
error.
In its approach to the Schall case, therefore, the Court was not consistent with its
prior juvenile justice decisions, in which the protection of the juvenile from the dangers
inherent in minimally regulated procedures was the paramount concern. The Schall
Court stated that it had, in its prior cases, attempted to delineate where the differences
between juvenile and criminal proceedings lay by striking a balance between the require-
ment of fundamental fairness and the desire to maintain flexibility in the juvenile
process. 2 I 8 The Court in Schall, however, placed much greater weight on the latter
concern than it had in its past opinions, and justified this shift by downgrading both the
juvenile's interest in liberty and the significance of the detention itself. 219
The Court accomplished this end by departing substantially from the reasoning
undergone in its earlier juvenile justice cases at several points in the Schall opinion. First,
the Court failed to follow the Kent decision's mandate of requiring procedural regularity
in the application of the statute. 22° Instead, the Court was content to allow the New York
Family Court judges to continue to apply subjective criteria in the juvenile detention
hearings. 221
 The Court briefly stated that no additional procedures had been proposed
that would improve the accuracy of the detention process without unduly impinging on
the achievement of the state purposes, 222
 The majority opinion failed to demonstrate,
however, how suggested factors that are designed to provide limiting guidelines for a
Family Court judge to follow in juvenile detention proceedings 2" would result in more
lengthy, formal proceedings with no counterbalancing improvement in decisionmaking
accuracy. Even if the juvenile judge's decisionmaking flexibility would be hampered by
statutorily mandated criteria, the Court in Breed expressly stated that a lessening of
flexibility alone was an insufficient ground on which to refuse application of a particular
procedure to the juvenile courts. 224 The Schall Court disregards this consideration in its
apparent eagerness to heed Chief justice Burger's criticism in his Winship dissent about
overly restricting the administration of the juvenile justice system. 225
The second example of the Schall Court's failure to follow precedent is in its
resurrection of the parens patriae justification for the absence of substantive standards
and procedural rules in juvenile proceedings, 226 The Schall Court stated that a juvenile
proceeding is fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial because the State is
concerned not with convicting the juvenile, but instead with protecting and rehabilitating
218 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2409.
2 " id. at 2410-11, 2413-15.
220 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
221 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2418. Justice Marshall emphasized his concern over this unfettered
discretion, stating that discretion can mask the use by officials of illegitimate criteria in allocating
important goods and rights. Id. at 2432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 2417.
221
 Judge Newman, concurring in Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Newman, J., concurring), suggested the following statutory improvements: limitations on crimes
for which the juvenile has been arrested or which he is likely to commit if released; a determination
of the likelihood that the juvenile committed the crime; an assessment of the juvenile's background;
and a more specific standard of proof. Id, at 377.
224
 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535 n.15 (1975).
272 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
226 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
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the child.227 In prior cases, however, the Court had voiced strong criticism of the parens
patriae justification, and had refused to apply a civil label-of-convenience to the juvenile
proceeding in light of the potential penalties suffered by the child. 228 The Schall Court
was thus attempting to revive the original conceptual difference between the juvenile
and adult processes after it had earlier conceded the invalidity of that proposition.
Finally, the Court appears almost naive in its characterization of the juvenile deten-
tion conditions as benign. 229 The Court upheld the validity of preventive detention in
part because a child is always in some form of custody, 23') indicating therefore that
detention of a juvenile is somehow not as significant to the child as it would be to an
adult. This position is in direct contradiction with the Court's decision in Gault, in which
it sharply criticized this justification for disregarding a juvenile's interest in liberty. 28 ' In
further support of its position that the detention of juveniles does not infringe upon
any constitutionally protected right, the Court described the availability of nonsecure
and secure detention — secure detention being more restrictive but still, in the Court's
opinion, consistent with the state's parens patriae objectives. 232 The Court also relied on
the fact that, absent exceptional circumstances, a juvenile cannot be sent to an adult
prison. 233 The Schall dissent is correct in finding the majority's depiction of the nature
of the confinement unsupportable on the record. 284 Secure detention under section
320.5(3)(b) entails incarceration in a facility closely approximating a jail, and pretrial
juvenile detainees are sometimes mixed with juveniles who have already been found to
be delinquent. 288 Preventively detained juveniles are, therefore, potential targets for both
assault and sexual abuse. 288 The Court in its prior decisions recognized the grim reality
of juvenile incarceration, and such prior discussions belie the naive view of the nature
of juvenile confinement taken in Schall. In Gault, for example, the Court admitted that
227
	 104 S. Ct. at 2409.
228 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 365 -66; see also Breed, 421 U.S. at 530.
229 See Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2413-14.
23° Id. at 2410.
23 Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. In its consideration of the assertion that the right of a state to deny a
child procedural rights is justified by the fact that the child is always in "custody," the Gault Court
found this theoretical basis for this "peculiar system" to be, at the least, "debatable." Id.
232 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2413-14. According to the majority:
Nonsecure detention involves an open facility in the community, a sort of "halfway
house," without locks, bars or security officers ....
Secure detention is more restrictive, but is still consistent with the regulatory and
parens patriae objectives relied upon by the State. Children are assigned to separate
dorms based on age, size and behavior. They wear street clothes provided by the
institution and partake in educational and recreational programs and counseling ses-
sions run by trained social workers. Misbehavior is punished by confinement to one's
room.
Id. at 2413.
233 /d. at 2413.
234 Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235 Id. at 2424 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The trial court stated that in a secure facility, "Itlhe
juveniles are subjected to strip-searches, wear institutional clothing, and follow institutional regimen
." Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 695 n.5.
Judge Quitones, a family. court judge, also testified as to the conditions at the facility, stating,
inter alia, that juveniles are liable to be exposed CO both assault and sexual assault.
Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2423-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2424 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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an "industrial school" was still incarceration which took the child away from his or her
family, and exposed him or her to disinterested custodians and potentially dangerous
fellow inmates. 232 The Breed opinion also eschewed the notion that calling commitment
"rehabilitation" made it any less incarceration." The two purported purposes of section
320.5(3)(b) are to protect both the community and the juvenile. Despite the grim realities
of juvenile detention, 249 the Supreme Court in Schall took the view that the "protective"
atmosphere of the detention facility will better serve the juvenile than will release, with
its potential for exposure to negative influences.
Apart from the traditional due process issues raised by New York's juvenile preven-
tive detention scheme, the Schall Court also considered whether pretrial detention pun-
ishes the presumptively innocent juvenile. 24° If the statute did provide for punishment
in the guise of prevention, application of that statute would be a per se violation of due
process."' The Schall Court stated that the lower court mistakenly equated detentions
that do not lead to continued confinement after an adjudication of guilt with "punitive
detentions.""2 This high incidence of released detainees, however, is relevant to the
issue of whether or not the provision is punitive because it indicates that the purported
crime prevention goal of the section is not substantially advanced."' While the Schall
237 Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
238 Breed, 421 U.S. at 530.
233 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2424 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As the dissent pointed out: "the impres-
sionability of juveniles may make the experience of incarceration more injurious to them than to
adults; all too quickly juveniles subjected to preventive detention come to see society at. large as
hostile and oppressive and to regard themselves as irremediably `delinquent, – Id. See also Aubry,
The Nature, Scope and Significance  of Pre-Trial Detention of Juveniles in California, 1 BLACK L.J. 160,
164 (1971), in which the author observed than
tj]uvcnile hall attendants have expressed surprise at the speed with which relative [sic]
innocent youngsters succumb to the infectious miasma of 'Juvy' and its practices,
attitudes and language. But this is not surprising. The experience tells the yOungster
that he is 'no good' and that society has rejected him. So he responds to society's
expectation, sees himself as a delinquent, and acts like one.
Id.
240 Schaff, 104 S. Ct. at 2412-13. See Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World
of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. Kr;v. 371 (1970). In his analysis of President Nixon's proposed legislation
requiring pretrial detention for recidivists, Tribe found the measure punitive: "[T]he proposed
system of pretrial preventive detention would inflict punishment rather than merely impose a
restraint, for it would imprison persons on the basis of a finding that, if given the opportunity, they
would make a morally culpable choice to commit a crime." Id. at 396.
See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965), in which the Court observed: "Punishment
serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent — and preventive. One of the reasons
society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that
does not make imprisonment any the less punishment." Id.
Even defendant's counsel acknowledged that one reason detainees are released after determi-
nation of their guilt is that the judge decides that their pretrial detention constituted sufficient
punishment. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2429 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Martin, 689 F.2d at 370-71 &
nn.27-28. A family court judge even admitted using preventive detention specifically to punish the
juvenile. Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 708.
See also Bell v. -Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 569 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("For in terms of the
nature of the imposition and the impact on detainees, pretrial incarceration „ . is essentially
indistinguishable from punishment.").
24 ' Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2412.
242 Id. at 2414.
243 Id. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Court found this point "irrelevant," 44 it is difficult to justify the provision as serving a
preventive purpose when the majority of juveniles who were found too dangerous to
release prior to their fact-finding hearings are then released even after they have been
found guilty. The results of the juvenile cases indicate that judges, in the exercise of
what the majority found to be suitable overcaution, incarcerate a large number of
juveniles who upon some further examination are found to pose no threat to society.
Apart from the question of whether the outcome of a juvenile detention case is
relevant to the constitutionality of the initial decision to detain, the broader issue of
whether a court is qualified to predict future behavior, and furthermore whether to use
such a prediction in carrying out its judicial function, pervades the Schall case. 245 Again,
aside from certain documents that the Family Court is required to consider, 24° there are
no requirements as to which criteria must be considered by the judge in forming his or
her opinion. 247 One need only examine the Schall data concerning subsequently released
detainees, of whom few engage in subsequent criminal activities, to become aware of the
substantial tendency of the family court judges to overpredict and to identify as poten-
tially dangerous those persons who, if released, would engage in no further violent or
even criminal behavior. 245 Although the Court readily condoned such predictions as
being the foundation for many decisions in the criminal justice system, 249 Justice Mar-
shall's dissent correctly observed that, in all such instances, the person whose future
conduct was at issue had already been convicted of a crime. 250 Under Altai!, a determi-
nation of probable cause for the alleged crime is not even necessary before the judge
decides whether the juvenile would "again" violate the law. 251
Finally, while the majority stated more than once that due process violations which
might arise during juvenile preventive detention procedures could be examined on a
case by case hasis,252 there are several major flaws with this position. First, the nature of
244 Id. at 2415.
245
	 at 2417-18, 2426 n.20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24F,
	
at 2420-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The judge employs in his or her decisionmaking a
petition for delinquency prepared by a state agency, and a written report and recommendation of
the parole officer. Id.
247 Id. at 2920 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
245
	
Reftrente of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking
Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 542 (1977-1978). For a criticism of the ability to
predict future conduct, see Schlesinger, The Prediction of Dangerousness in Juveniles; A Replication, 24
CRIME & Dy.i.iNt2. 40, 48 (1978) (no significant relationships found in study investigating application
of predictor variables in predicting dangerousness).
241'
	
104 S. Ct. at 2417.
25r)
	 at 2426 11.20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25 ' It is somewhat surprising, in light of the Court's decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
126 (1975) (person arrested and held for trial is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause before pretrial restraint of liberty), that the appellees and the dissent did not
base their arguments more strongly on this issue. The majority briefly referred to a juvenile's right
to challenge detention for lack of probable cause, but sidestepped Gerstein by stating that it did not
mandate a specific timetable for a probable cause determination. Srhall, 104 S. Ct. at 2415. The
Court could have merely stated that Gerstein did not apply in the juvenile context, and therefore
have avoided the probable cause issue altogether, but instead it chose the tactic of appearing to
consider Gerstein's requirements on the one hand and dismissing them on the other. 'Me dissent,
while noting its dissatisfaction with this approach, did not press the issue any further. Id. at 2420,
2425 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252 Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2912 n.18, 2415.
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the procedure as conducted under section 320.5(3)(b) is such that its mistakes are virtually
undetectable when the error is on the side of overcaution. The system will appear to be
malfunctioning only when it releases persons who prove to be worse risks than antici-
pated. When the system detains those who could safely have been released, its errors
will be invisible. 25 3 How can a detainee prove that he or she would not have committed
a crime, and, thus, should not have been detained? Second, the Court set forth no
guidelines as to which errors in decisionmaking would constitute grounds for relief; it
merely stated rather vaguely that the propriety of the decision of the family court judge
must be evaluated in light of the information available to him or her at the time. 2" The
Court did not even require procedural regularity in the exercise of the judges' broad
discretion, as it had in previous decisions. 255 Such a subjective procedure, under which
judges may remand juveniles according to standards as varied as the judges themselves,
is insufficient to guarantee proper protection of the juvenile's constitutional right to
liberty. The standard for appeal thus appears to be as subjective as the initial procedure
itself. According to Schall a juvenile may not even use his subsequent release as evidence
of a mistaken decision to detain, as the Court found the final outcome of a case to be
irrelevant to the propriety of the initial decision to detain. 25" It is difficult to conceive,
therefore, of the particular circumstances under which a juvenile would be granted
relief. It is unfortunate that the Court decided in the Schall case to renew its distance
from the juvenile justice system in order to revive those aspects of the system which it.
believes to be beneficial for both the juvenile and the state. 257 The Court has upheld
with little truly probative examination a statute that, while perhaps advancing somewhat
the goal of flexibility, takes a significant step backward in the protection of a juvenile's
fundamental right to liberty.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Schall it, Martin held that the pretrial preventive detention
of juveniles under New York's Family Court Act does not violate the clue process clause
because the Court found that the detention serves the legitimate state objective of crime
prevention, and further that there are sufficient procedural protections in the application
of the statute.258 The Court stated that no specific criteria need be considered by the
judge in the detention decision, 259 and individual claims of due process violations would
be handled on a case by case basis. 25"
The Schall Court's unwillingness to restrict the application of preventive detention
may be in part clue to its concern over the increasing seriousness of juvenile crime.
Citing recent statistics on juvenile involvement in serious crime, 2" 1 the Court stressed
255
	 supra note 240, at 375.
254 SC/1 111/, 104 S. Ct. at 2415.
255
	 e.g., Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
25" Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2415.
257 Id. at 2409-10.
258
 M. at 2406.
259 Id. at 2418.
2" Id. at 2415.
211 Id. at 2410 11.14. In 1982, juveniles accounted for 7.5% of all arrests for violent crimes.
19.9% of all arrests for serious property crime, and 17.3% of all arrests for the two categories
combined. Id. (citing United States Dep't of justice, 1982 Crime in the United States, 176-77
(1983)).
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that the harm suffered by a crime victim is not dependent upon the age of the perpe-
trator. 262 This point, however distressing, does not support the Court's holding. If the
crimes committed by juveniles are virtually indistinguishable from those perpetrated by
adults, then juveniles who are brought to justice for such acts should not be subject to
severe penalties such as pretrial detention, which may not even be applicable to adults,
without benefit of the same procedural protections available in the criminal justice system.
Assuming that juvenile crime is becoming more serious, it is incongruous that the Court
in Schall should use the traditional fundamental fairness theory to justify the treatment
of juvenile offenders in a manner that is more harsh and arbitrary than that suffered
by adult criminals.
The significance of the Schall decision will not be lost on juvenile court judges, whose
preventive detention decisions will now be virtually insulated from review due to the
lack of guidelines from the Court and due to the inherent nature of the process itself.
There is little incentive for a judge to make a thoughtful decision based on sufficient
factual data when the Supreme Court requires that no specific criteria be considered in
the judge's decisionmaking process, nor even that the minimal procedural regularity
mandated in its earlier decisions be observed.
In the area of juvenile preventive detention, therefore, errors will continue to be
made on the side of overcaution, as such detention may become the accepted norm in
juvenile delinquency proceedings. If the Supreme Court follows the ideological shift set
forth in Schall in its future decisions in this area, juveniles may well find themselves in
the same position as they were prior to Kent: being exposed to virtually the same stigma
and penalties as an adult offender without benefit of the adult's constitutionally man-
dated rights in facing those consequences. Should this trend continue, it will be necessary
for the individual states of their own volition to institute procedural guidelines attendant
to juvenile preventive detention proceedings in order to protect the juvenile's funda-
mental interest in liberty.
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ses Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410.
